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Trust in scientific information
mediates associations
between conservatism
and coronavirus responses
in the U.S., but few other nations
Quinnehtukqut McLamore1,26*, Stylianos Syropoulos1,26, Bernhard Leidner1,
Gilad Hirschberger2, Kevin Young1, Rizqy Amelia Zein3, Anna Baumert4,25, Michal Bilewicz5,
Arda Bilgen20, Maarten J. van Bezouw6, Armand Chatard7, Peggy Chekroun8,
Juana Chinchilla10, Hoon‑Seok Choi9, Hyun Euh23, Angel Gomez10, Peter Kardos11,
Ying Hooi Khoo12, Mengyao Li4, Jean‑Baptiste Légal8, Steve Loughnan13, Silvia Mari14,
Roseann Tan‑Mansukhani15, Orla Muldoon16, Masi Noor17, Maria Paola Paladino24,
Nebojša Petrović18, Hema Preya Selvanathan19, Özden Melis Uluğ20, Michael J. Wohl21,
Wai Lan Victoria Yeung22 & B. Burrows1
U.S.-based research suggests conservatism is linked with less concern about contracting coronavirus
and less preventative behaviors to avoid infection. Here, we investigate whether these tendencies are
partly attributable to distrust in scientific information, and evaluate whether they generalize outside
the U.S., using public data and recruited representative samples across three studies (Ntotal = 34,710).
In Studies 1 and 2, we examine these relationships in the U.S., yielding converging evidence for a
sequential indirect effect of conservatism on compliance through scientific (dis)trust and infection
concern. In Study 3, we compare these relationships across 19 distinct countries. Although the
relationships between trust in scientific information about the coronavirus, concern about coronavirus
infection, and compliance are consistent cross-nationally, the relationships between conservatism
and trust in scientific information are not. These relationships are strongest in North America.
Consequently, the indirect effects observed in Studies 1–2 only replicate in North America (the U.S.
and Canada) and in Indonesia. Study 3 also found parallel direct and indirect effects on support for
lockdown restrictions. These associations suggest not only that relationships between conservatism
and compliance are not universal, but localized to particular countries where conservatism is more
strongly related to trust in scientific information about the coronavirus pandemic.
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While the coronavirus pandemic has affected hundreds of millions of people, the impact has not been evenly distributed. The United States, despite comprising approximately 4.25% of the global population, has led the world
in both coronavirus cases and deaths throughout 2020 and 2 0211. While there are societal-level reasons why the
pandemic has hit the U.S. particularly hard (e.g., delayed pandemic responses, mismanagement by leadership;
see2, individual attitudes and behaviors have helped shape how communities are affected by the pandemic. Over
the course of the pandemic, social scientists have striven to understand factors that underlie such individual
differences3. Among Americans, empirical evidence suggests that one such factor is political ideology. A number
of recent studies suggest that, in American samples, conservatism predicts less concern about contracting the
coronavirus and less engagement in behaviors (i.e., social distancing) that prevent its spread4–7.
From one perspective8, these patterns are puzzling because political conservatives are thought to be more
vigilant against physical threats (such as infectious disease) than liberals9–11. From another, these patterns are
consistent with recent evidence that conservatives and liberals may instead be sensitive to different specific types
of collective threats based upon their political identities12–14. Among Americans, these patterns are consistent
with existing literature linking conservatism with lower trust in scientific information15. Emerging evidence
over the course of the coronavirus pandemic suggests that trust in science is a critical factor underlying threat
perception and compliance with preventative measures in the coronavirus p
 andemic16–18. These emergent findings suggest that conservatism has direct and indirect associations with compliance with preventative measures
through trust in science and risk perceptions. Here, we investigated whether, among Americans, conservatism
is indirectly associated with concern about contracting the coronavirus (i.e., personal threat perceptions) and
preventative behaviors (e.g., social distancing) through (dis)trust in scientific information about the coronavirus
pandemic, using larger, more representative samples than prior work. We further investigated whether these
patterns generalized beyond the United States, a context in which scientific trust in general, and about the coronavirus pandemic in particular, is highly polarized [ see15], using a large cross-national dataset.

Trust in scientific and medical information

One of the strongest predictors of threat perceptions from coronavirus infection, compliance with preventative
behaviors, and support for lockdown restrictions, is how much participants trust information from scientists
and scientific institutions16,18. Existing evidence gleaned from convenience samples during the early months
of the coronavirus pandemic suggests that conservatism may be an important antecedent of trust in scientific information within the context of the coronavirus p
 andemic16,18,19. This tendency is consistent with other
findings that components of conservatism (e.g., resistance to change, religiosity, and traditionalism) can lead
conservatives to distrust scientific fi
 ndings20,21. However, this distrust may be localized to particular scientific
areas (e.g., climate change)22,23, and there is also evidence that liberals may also be skeptical of ideologically
inconsistent information24–26. Thus, associations between conservatism and specific distrust of scientific and
medical information about the coronavirus may be less due to inherent features of conservatism and more due
to politicization of the pandemic.
Where such politicization of scientific areas is severe, such as the United States15,22,24,27, these implications can
be particularly deleterious. American conservatives are distrustful of scientists and scientific information24–26. Yet,
associations between conservatism and (dis)trust in scientific information specific to the coronavirus pandemic
may not completely generalize outside the United States, and evidence from convenience samples suggest that
the correlation is stronger in the United States than in other countries17,19. For comparison, the case of climate
change skepticism may be instructive. Among Americans, distrust in scientific information is promoted in
conservative media networks27–29, and conservatism is among the strongest predictors of skepticism in anthropogenic climate change30–32.
Yet, meta-analytic cross-national data reveals that this association is far stronger in the U.S. than anywhere
else measured33. Indeed, Hornsey and colleagues (2018) point out that three-quarters of the countries they surveyed displayed no significant meta-analytic relationship between conservatism and climate change skepticism.
One possible explanation for this cross-national variation was that in countries where such a relationship was
found, conservative politicians and media frame “green” goals as incompatible with their ideology and spread
misinformation about climate c hange33,34. By analogy, associations between conservatism and the coronavirus
pandemic may emerge most strongly in countries where the coronavirus pandemic has been particularly politicized [see a lso14,15,29].

Political ideology & threat perception during the coronavirus pandemic

Theoretically, heightened threat sensitivity has been viewed as an antecedent of right-wing political
ideologies8,35–37. Evidence suggests that political conservatives have higher needs for stability and security, motivating sensitivity and responsivity toward potential t hreats8,17,37,38. However, this evidence also suggests that
conservatism is linked more specifically to sensitivity to proximal, immediate physical threats14,38, whereas there
are circumstances in which liberals and leftists are more sensitive than conservatives to more global, abstract
(but still physical) threats such as climate change or health care i nfrastructure38,39. The nature of the threat the
coronavirus pandemic represents could therefore lead conservatives to be less concerned about the pandemic.
However, Plohl and Musil (2020) argue that perceived risk associated with the pandemic should be predicted
by the extent to which participants trust scientific information because scientific and medical authorities are the
primary source of information about the threat. If, as their study and others suggest, conservatism serves as an
antecedent of trust in science (see16–19), then conservatism may be associated with risk perceptions through the
mechanism of (dis)trust in scientific information. However, this association could only be expected to emerge
when conservatism is associated with trust in scientific information. In general, such a link can be observed in
the U.S. across multiple c ontexts24,40–43. More specifically, conservatives in the U.S. may express less concern about
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contracting the virus and engage in less protective behaviors to avoid spreading it (4) in part because conservative politicians and media within that country explicitly downplay the risk (7,44–47; see also48). Notably, trust in
then-President Donald Trump was among the strongest predictors of coronavirus responses49.
In contrast, such effects were not observed among Germans, for whom conservatism was positively associated
with concern about contracting the c oronavirus50, as predicted by prior t heory8. Similar effects were observed
in Israel, whose then-Prime Minister Netanyahu instead emphasized the threat of the p
 andemic51, taking a hard
line with strict lockdowns that went so far as to outlaw mass protests altogether during the pandemic, yielding
opposition from more left-wing citizens of Israel52. These findings further suggest that the patterns observed by
Plohl and Musil (2020) may not generalize globally.

Research overview

Plohl and Musil (2020), Pagliaro and colleagues (2021), and Sulik and colleagues (in press) have described
indirect associations between conservatism and compliance with preventative measures during the coronavirus
pandemic. However, these studies relied upon convenience samples, and did not test whether these indirect
effects were stronger in the U.S. compared to in other countries. In three studies (Ntotal = 34,710), we tested for
associations between political ideology with attitudes and beliefs towards the coronavirus pandemic through trust
in scientific information about the coronavirus pandemic and concern about contracting the coronavirus using
representative, high-powered samples from multiple research teams. We hypothesized that among Americans,
conservatism would indirectly relate to concerns about contracting the coronavirus through trust in scientific
authorities and institutions (H1), but that these effects should be strongest where reactions to coronavirus are
strongly polarized, particularly the United States (H2).
The data presented in Studies 1a–1b utilize public, representative samples from the ANES 2020 Social Media
Study before and after the 2020 Presidential election. In Studies 2a–2b, we present parallel data from two distinct
representative samples of Americans during the same time period, allowing for replication of effects between
different research teams as well as across time periods. In Study 3, we analyzed data from a previously collected
(May–July 2020) large, three-wave, cross-sectional study of attitudes and behaviors in the coronavirus pandemic
from 21 countries to evaluate how present such relationships are across the world.

Studies 1a–1b

We made use of publicly available data from large, representative samples of the American population from
the American National Election Studies (ANES). Specifically, data for Studies 1a–1b were obtained from the
ANES Social Media Study, conducted between before (Study 1a) and after (Study 1b) the 2020 U.S. presidential
election. All data and materials for this study can be found here: https://electionstudies.org/data-center/2020-
social-media-study/. With these data, we again examined associations between conservatism, concern about
contracting the coronavirus, and trust in science and scientific information. Owing to the vastly different set of
variables available in this data, we examined trust in a specific organization dispensing scientific and medical
information in Studies 1a–1b, specifically, the Center for Disease Control (CDC). While informed consent for
use of this data as publicly available data was obtained, the researchers never directly interacted with these participants, as Studies 1a–1b conduct analyses of public data. The analyses in these studies were not pre-registered.

Methods

Participants. A sample of 5750 Americans was collected by ANES in T1 (August 2020). Here, 2905 participants were male (50.52%) and 2845 were female (49.48%). At T1, 3983 participants identified as White (69.27%),
611 as Black or African American (10.63%), 736 as Hispanic (7.30%), and 420 as other racial or ethnic identities,
including Asian Americans (7.30%). The average age was 49.51 years (SD = 16.27).
For T2 (November 2020) 5277 participants took part in the survey. In this sample, 2664 participants were male
and 2613 were female. In terms of race and ethnicity, 3702 participants identified as White, 544 as Black, 647 as
Hispanic, and 384 as Asian, mixed, or some other race/ethnicity. The average age was 50.91 years (SD = 16.78).
Further demographic information for both studies is presented in Table S1.
Materials and procedure. From the ANES Social Media Study, the variables relevant to our investigation

were a measure of political ideology, concern about contracting the coronavirus personally, and confidence in
the CDC (serving as a measure of trust in a specific source of scientific information). Political ideology was
measured using a single 7-point Likert scale (1 = Very Liberal; 7 = Very Conservative; midpoint = 4, “Neither
liberal nor Conservative”), pre-election: M = 4.07, SD = 1.78; post-election: M = 4.04, SD = 1.81. Concern about
contracting the virus was also measured using a single item (“How worried are you personally about getting
the coronavirus (COVID-19)?”; 1 = Not at all worried; 5 = Extremely worried), pre-election: M = 2.72, SD = 1.21;
post-election: M = 2.78, SD = 1.21. One item, (“How much confidence do you have in the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control (CDC)?”), measured on a 1 (“None”) to 5 (“A great deal”) Likert scale was used as a proxy for trust in
scientific information sources, M = 3.15, SD = 1.12; post-election: M = 3.34, SD = 1.16.

Data analysis. All data analysis in Studies 1a–1b was conducted using SAS 9.453. As the data collected in
Studies 1a–1b were non-probability samples, with the aim of matching the population of the United States,
ANES recommends the use of sampling weights for analyses with these data (see https://electionstudies.org/
data-center/2020-social-media-study/). Thus, all analytical procedures accounted for the sampling weights provided by ANES. For preliminary analyses, we used the proc corr command (accounting for sample weights) to
probe (weighted) correlations between conservatism, confidence in the CDC, and concern about contracting
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Figure 1.  (A, B) Indirect effect test (proc calis, SAS 9.4, Path Model with weighted coefficients, Maximum
Likelihood testing method) of conservative ideology on concerns about COVID-19 via the mechanism of trust
in science, controlling for binarized gender (male = 1, female = − 1), education level, income level, and age, in
Study 1a (A, top) and Study 1b (B, bottom). Figure was constructed in Microsoft PowerPoint with manually
input data copied from SAS 9.4 output. Note: ***p < .001.
the coronavirus. For our main analyses probing indirect effects, the proc calis command (accounting for sample
weights) was used to construct a path model using maximum likelihood estimates.

Results

Correlations. In the T1 sample, conservatism was negatively correlated with confidence in the CDC,
r(5733) = − 0.253, p < 0.001, and with concern about contracting the coronavirus, r(5737) = − 0.336, p < 0.001.
Confidence in the CDC was positively correlated with concern, r(5741) = 0.223, p < 0.001.
Similarly, in the T2 sample, conservatism was negatively correlated with confidence in the CDC,
r(5261) = − 0.367, p < 0.001, and with concern about contracting the coronavirus, r(5263) = − 0.330, p < 0.001.
Confidence in the CDC was positively correlated with concern, r(5272) = 0.277, p < 0.001.
Indirect effect test.

For both the pre and post-election surveys, we conducted tests for indirect effects of
conservatism on concern through a proxy for trust in scientific institutions, here confidence in the CDC, controlling for age, binarized gender (male = 1, female = − 1), income, and education level.
In Study 1a, we found a significant indirect effect whereby conservatism was associated with less confidence
in the CDC, which was associated with more concern about contracting the virus, thus conservatism indirectly
was linked to less concern through confidence in the CDC, b = − 0.027, SE = 0.003, t = − 9.99, p < 0.001 (Fig. 1A).
Yet, the direct effect of conservatism on concern remained significant, b = − 0.209, SE = 0.009, t = − 23.08, p < 0.001;
total effect: b = − 0.236, SE = 0.009, t = − 26.63, p < 0.001. The indirect effect observed represented 11.39% of the
total effect.
In Study 1b, we also found a significant indirect effect, such that conservatism was associated with less confidence in the CDC, which was associated with more concern about contracting the virus, thus conservatism
indirectly related to less concern through confidence in the CDC, b = − 0.045, SE = 0.004, t = − 11.94, p < 0.001
(Fig. 1B). Once again, the direct effect of conservatism on concern remained significant, b = − 0.180, SE = 0.009,
t = − 19.10, p < 0.001; total effect: b = − 0.226, SE = 0.009, t = − 25.28, p < 0.001. The indirect effect observed represented 20.12% of the total effect. The estimated models for both the pre-election survey (χ2(8) = 304.70, p < 0.001,
CFI = 0.90, RMSEA = 0.08, SRMR = 0.04) and the post-election survey (χ2(10) = 313.27, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.97,
RMSEA = 0.08, SRMR = 0.04) displayed good fit under Kline (2016) parameters.
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Studies 2a–2b

We collected data in two nationally representative samples, before and after the 2020 U.S. presidential election.
Given our ability to control the survey instruments, we conceptually replicated our findings with more comprehensive and detailed measures of trust in science and concern for COVID-19. Further, we also expanded on
our findings by investigating the additional outcome of compliance to COVID-19 recommendations. Informed
consent was obtained by the researchers for all participant data used in Studies 2a–2b.

Methods

Participants. While these analyses were not pre-registered, the sampling method was pre-determined for
both samples (see AsPredicted #48042 and #53678). All research in Studies 2a–2b received approval from the
University of Massachusetts Amherst Institutional Review Board (IRB Protocol #2317). All activities involving
these participants were approved by the University of Massachusetts Amherst IRB and complied with all APA
guidelines and policies for human subjects research.
Study 2a. The first sample (N = 1672 Americans) was collected via C
 loudResearch54 in late September 2020.
CloudResearch includes features which allow the recruitment of census-matched samples (see https://www.
cloudresearch.com/resources/blog/how-to-gather-demographically-representative-samples-in-online-studi
es/). In this sample, 595 (43.98%) participants were male, 753 (55.65%) were female, and 5 were nonbinary or
other genders (0.37%), while 319 provided no response for gender identity. In terms of participant race and ethnicity, 957 (70.78%) identified as White, 158 (11.69%) as Black, 142 (10.50%) as Hispanic or Latino, 58 -(4.29%)
as Asian, 15 (1.11%) as Native American, and 22 (1.63%) as other races/ethnicities, while 320 participants provided no response. The average age was 43.80 years (SD = 17.36).
Study 2b. The second sample (N = 1431 Americans) was collected via Lucid in early December 2020. Lucid is
another crowdsourcing website capable of recruiting a demographically diverse and nationally representative
sample at a low cost with good r eliability54. In this sample, 555 (47.93%) participants were male, 597 (51.55%)
were female, 6 (0.52%) were non-binary or other genders, and 273 provided no response for gender. In terms of
race and ethnicity, 840 (72.66%) participants identified as White, 133 (11.51%) as Black, 87 (7.53%) as Hispanic
or Latino, 52 (4.50%) as Asian, 19 (1.64%) as Native American, 25 (2.16%) as other races/ethnicities, and 275
provided no response. The average age was 45.46 years (SD = 16.80).

Materials and procedure. Participants were presented with a battery of measures followed by demo-

graphic questions. They were then subsequently debriefed about the purpose of the study. For the purposes
of the current investigation, were solely interested in measures of ideology, trust in science, concern about the
pandemic, and compliance intentions. The same measures that follow were displayed in the same manner and
scale across both studies.

Conservative ideology. We measured individual’s political ideology with a single-item measure obtained from
the most recent YouGov poll (“In general, I am…”). Scores ranged from “1 = Very liberal” to “7 = Very Conservative”, (Study 2a: M = 3.65, SD = 1.76; Study 2b: M = 3.86, SD = 1.85).
Trust in science. Given that both trust in science in general, as well as trust in specific scientific institutes was
found to be an antecedent of concerns for the coronavirus pandemic, we incorporated both components in our
measure of trust in science. These items were preceded by the stem “To what extent do you trust information
about the coronavirus if it comes from each of the following information sources?” and were measured on a 1–5
Likert scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). These were: (1) The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC);
(2) Scientific authorities and professionals (e.g., epidemiologists, virologists); and (3) Medical professionals (e.g.,
doctors, nurses, surgeons, EMTs). This composite demonstrated good reliability in both Study 2a (M = 3.87,
SD = 0.95, a = 0.82), and Study 2b (M = 3.91, SD = 0.96, a = 0.83).
Coronavirus concern. A single item was used to measure concern about contracting the coronavirus, “Which,
if any, of the following statements describes your feelings toward getting the coronavirus?” measured on a 1 to 4
point Likert scale (I am not at all/not very/ somewhat/ very scared I will contact the coronavirus (COVID-19),
in both Study 2a, M = 2.73, SD = 0.99, and Study 2b, M = 2.91, SD = 0.97.
Coronavirus compliance. Four items on 0–10 Likert scale ranging from “0 = Never” to “10 = All the Time”, were
used to capture individual differences in reported compliance to COVID-19 recommendations (e.g., “How often
have you avoided social gatherings due to COVID-19?”, “How often have you avoided non-essential travel?”).
This composite demonstrated good reliability in both Study 2a (M = 7.89, SD = 2.31, a = 0.87), and Study 2b
(M = 8.17, SD = 2.23, a = 0.87).

Data analysis. All data analysis for Studies 2a–2b was conducted using SAS 9.453. Unlike Studies 1a–1b,

the samples we collected here were not recruited using non-probability methods, and thus weighting was not
necessary. Similar to Studies 1a–1b, however, preliminary analyses involved computing zero-order correlations
between conservatism, trust in science, concern about contracting the coronavirus, and coronavirus compliance
using the proc corr command. Sequential indirect effects were modeled using Hayes’s PROCESS macro, version
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1

2

3

4

1. Conservative Ideology

–

− 16

− 15

− 0.08

2. Trust in Science

− 0.16

–

0.31

0.42

3. COVID-19 Concerns

− 0.22

0.27

–

0.41

4. COVID-19 Compliance

− 0.21

0.49

0.41

–

Table 1.  Bivariate correlations for Study 2a (below the diagonal) and Study 2b (above the diagonal). All
coefficients are higher than .10 are significant at p < 0.001, all coefficients below .10 are significant at p < .01.

Study 2a

Study 2b

Effect

SE

Lower 95% CI

Upper 95% CI

% of Total Effect

Effect

SE

Lower 95% CI

Upper 95% CI

% of Total Effect

Total Indirect effect

− 0.14

0.02

− 0.18

− 0.10

50.65

− 0.12

0.02

− 0.16

− 0.08

77.92

Ideology→ Trust in Science→
Compliance

− 0.07

0.01

− 0.1

− 0.04

25.33

− 0.06

0.01

− 0.09

− 0.04

38.96

Ideology→Concerns→Comp
liance

− 0.06

0.01

− 0.08

− 0.04

21.71

− 0.03

0.01

− 0.06

− 0.01

19.48

0.004

− 0.02

− 0.008

3.62

− 0.02

0.01

− 0.03

− 0.01

12.99

Ideology→ Trust in
− 0.01
science→Concerns→Compliance

Table 2.  Indirect effects depicted in Fig. 2a–b.

3, for SAS 9.455 with 10,000 bootstrap samples, as this was possible given the non-necessity of weighting samples
in these studies (see https://processmacro.org/faq.html).

Results

Correlations. In both studies, having a more conservative political ideology was associated with less trust in
science, less concerns about COVID-19, and less compliance to COVID-19 recommendations. Trust in science
was positively associated with more COVID-19 concerns and compliance. Finally, COVID-19 concerns were
positively associated with compliance (Table 1).
Indirect effect test. To test our full hypothesis in each study, we computed an indirect effect test. We controlled for age, being male (compared to being either female or non-binary, male = 1; not male = − 1; analyzed
thusly as there is evidence that men are less likely to comply with recommended behaviors than other genders56,57
income and education level. Results across both studies suggested that conservative ideology was associated
with both less trust in science and less concern about the pandemic. Both trust in science and concerns about
COVID-19, in turn, were associated with greater compliance. All indirect effects were significant across both
studies (Table 2). While the direct effect of conservatism upon compliance remained significant before the 2020
Presidential election (Study 2a), the direct effect was non-significant after the election (Study 2b; Fig. 2A–B).

Study 3

In Study 3, we sought to re-examine our hypothesis across different nations, once again employing representative
samples. Our aim was to determine whether the negative link between a conservative political ideology with
trust in science and beliefs towards the Coronavirus pandemic (i.e. concern about the pandemic, compliance
with COVID-19 recommendations, and support for stricter measures to prevent the spread of the pandemic),
is found across nations, or is localized to particular countries, such as the United States, given the relationships
between conservative U.S. media ecosystems and coronavirus responses ( see7).

Methods

Participants. We recruited data across 21 countries and special administrative regions, recruiting a total of
25,159 participants. These included: Australia, Canada, China, Spain, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary,
Indonesia, the Republic of Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Serbia,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In China and Hong Kong no measure of political ideology
was included in the survey because of risks to participants, and thus participants from these countries were
excluded from the current investigation, leaving us with a total of 19 countries (N = 20,580; Table S2 for country
specific Ns and descriptive statistics). Participants were recruited across three cross-sectional waves: Wave 1: May
4th, 2020–May 21st, 2020; Wave 2: June 15th, 2020–June 23rd, 2020; Wave 3: July 20th, 2020–July 28th, 2020,
via CloudResearch58,59. Samples sizes were determined based on an a priori power analysis detect interactions
between time-point comparisons and cross-country comparisons for a small-to-medium effect size (Cohen’s
f = 0.160; see60). Thus, we aimed to recruit at least 300 participants per wave in each country. To approach a
more representative sample from each country, data was collected to fill known representative percentages for
a variety of demographic characteristics, such as level of education, race/ethnicity, urbanization, religion, age,
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Figure 2.  (A, B). Indirect effect tests (Process Macro, Model 655, 10,000 bootstrapped samples) of conservative
ideology on compliance to COVID-19 recommendations, via the indirect sequential pathways of trust in science
and concerns about COVID-19, controlling for maleness (male = 1, not male = − 1), income, education level,
and age, in both Study 2a (A, top) and 2b (B, bottom). Figure was constructed in Microsoft PowerPoint with
manually input data copied from SAS 9.4 output. Note: **p < .01; ***p < .001.
gender, income. These levels were established through census-level data of each country population. In the U.S
we aimed to recruit truly representative samples, via the same demographic characteristics as above but with a
larger number of participants (N = 1200) per wave. While these analyses were not pre-registered, the sampling
method was pre-determined for all samples (see https://osf.io/g29z4/). All research conducted in this study
received approval from the University of Massachusetts Amherst IRB (IRB Protocol #2063) and complied with
all APA guidelines and policies for human subjects research. Informed consent was obtained by the researchers
for all participant data used in Study 3.

Materials and procedure. Participants first provided consent, and then completed a questionnaire with
various measures. After completing all the measures and providing demographic information, participants were
asked questions pertaining to any upcoming or recently concluded elections in their country, and were then subsequently debriefed and remunerated. All measures were first generated in English. They were then translated/
back-translated into applicable languages for each country. In the sections that follow, descriptive statistics and
reliabilities capture values across all waves and countries (Table S2 for country-specific information). Unless
otherwise noted, all measures were captured on a 1–9 slider scale.
Political ideology. An item identical to that utilized in Studies 2a and 2b, measured on a 1–7 Likert scale was
used to capture left/right wing ideology (M = 3.80, SD = 1.57).
Trust in science. We generated two items to measure trust in science, which preceded by the sentence: “To what
extent do you trust information about coronavirus if it comes from each of the following information sources?”
(“Scientific authorities and professionals (e.g., epidemiologists, virologists)” and “Medical professionals (e.g.,
doctors, nurses, surgeons, EMTs)”). Trust in science was measured with the average of these two items (a = 0.77,
αrange = 0.68–0.82, M = 7.11, SD = 1.64).
Concerns about contracting COVID‑19. A single-item measure (“Which, if any, of the following statements
describes your feelings toward getting the coronavirus? I am not at all/not very/ somewhat/ very scared I will contract the coronavirus (COVID-19)”); this measure was identical to one of three items used to capture COVID-19
concerns in Studies 2a and 2b). This measure was captured on a 1–4 Likert scale (M = 2.49, SD = 1.10).
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Compliance with coronavirus guidelines. A four-item measure was developed to capture the degree to which
participants complied with scientifically-recommended coronavirus (COVID-19) guidelines to reduce the
infection of the virus (“How often do you wash your hands with soap and water for at least 20 s when you enter
or exit your home?”; “How often do you stay at least 6 feet (or 2 m) away from anyone who is not a member of
your household when you are outside your home (e.g., social distancing?)”; “Do you avoid social gatherings due
to the coronavirus?”; “Have you been cancelling, and are you avoiding, any non-essential travel”). The measure
was overall reliable (a = 0.77, αrange = 0.61–0.83, M = 7.49, SD = 1.51).
Support for lockdown restrictions. Seven-items were generated to measure how much participants supported
preventative restrictions upon civil liberties during lockdowns (e.g., “National intelligence services should
track and collect data from people suspected to be infected with coronavirus;” “The military should be used
domestically in order to assist with responses to the coronavirus”). This measure was reliable as well (a = 0.84,
αrange = 0.76–0.89, M = 6.17, SD = 1.80).

Data analysis. For preliminary analyses, we estimated correlations within each country for each wave
between political ideology and: (1) trust in science, (2) concerns about contracting COVID-19, (3) compliance
with COVID-19 regulations, (4) support for lockdown restrictions to prevent the spread of the virus using the
proc corr command in SAS 9.453. These correlations were used in order to estimate mean correlation effect sizes
(“meta-correlations”) across all three cross-sectional waves in each country using Goh and colleagues’ (2016)
methodology and publicly available calculation spreadsheets (see https://osf.io/8yubf/). These publicly available
materials detail the exact mathematical procedures used to compute and test the significance of meta-correlations. Thus, our meta-correlations were computed by inputting our data into these Microsoft Excel spreadsheets.
All of the above procedures were repeated in order to evaluate the correlations and meta-correlations between
trust in science and (1) concerns about contracting COVID-19, (2) compliance with COVID-19 regulations, and
(3) support for lockdown restrictions.
To replicate the indirect effects observed in the previous studies, while adding support for lockdown restrictions as an additional outcome, we constructed a series of path models in SAS 9.453 using the proc calis command.
Using the proc calis syntax, we allowed all exogenous variables to predict both sequential mediators (i.e., trust
in science, concerns about contracting COVID-19), and both sequential mediators to predict both outcomes
(compliance and support for lockdown restrictions), yielding a fully saturated model (see Fig. 4 for diagram).
We constructed one path model for each country in our sample. We then compared the path from political ideology to trust in science in the U.S. and Canada (separately) to each other and to each of the 17 other countries
in our sample.
Ethical statement.

All data collection procedures in which the authors collected data from human subjects
were approved by the University of Massachusetts Amherst Institutional Review Board (IRB). Separate protocols
were approved for Studies 2a–2b (IRB Protocol #2317) and Study 3 (IRB Protocol #2063). All procedures were
performed in accordance with the guidelines and regulations for human subjects research set by the University
of Massachusetts Amherst IRB. Informed consent was obtained from all participants.

Results

Meta‑Correlations. Political ideology. Correlations between political ideology and other variables in the

model in each wave and in each country and their corresponding meta-correlations are summarized in Supplementary Materials (raw correlations: Tables S3–S6; meta-correlations: Tables S7–S10). The meta-correlations
are visualized in Fig. 3A–D. The United States and Canada alone exhibited significant negative meta-correlations
between conservative ideology and all outcome variables. For trust in science and concern about contracting
coronavirus, their meta-correlations were also larger than those of the other 17 countries (Fig. 3A–B). Also,
while there was no significant relationship between conservatism and trust in science in 10 of 19 countries,
a positive meta-correlation was never observed (Fig. 3A). However, for compliance, Indonesia and Germany
exhibited meta-correlations of a similar strength to those of the U.S. and Canada, although the U.S. and Canada
were still among the largest across countries (Fig. 3C). With respect to lockdown restrictions, only three countries demonstrated a negative meta-correlation with conservatism: The United States, Canada, and South Korea,
whereas the meta-correlations were positive for 10 of 19 countries, with Israel’s being the strongest (Fig. 3D).

Trust in science. Raw correlations between trust in science and other variables in the model are presented
in Supplementary Materials in Table S11. The meta-correlations we found suggest that while direct associations between conservatism and coronavirus responses might be localized to particular countries, links between
trust in scientific information and outcomes are more consistent. Meta-correlations between trust in scientific
information about coronavirus and concern about contracting the coronavirus were significant and positive in
16 of 19 countries (rmedian = 0.12, rmin = 0.07, rmax = 0.20, all ps < 0.05), and were never significant and negative
(Figure S1). Further, both the meta-correlation between trust in scientific information about coronavirus and
compliance with preventative behaviors (rmedian = 0.35, rmin = 0.22, rmax = 0.47, all ps < 0.001; Figure S2) and the
meta-correlation between trust in scientific information about coronavirus and support for lockdown restrictions (rmedian = 0.29, rmin = 0.15, rmax = 0.44, all ps < 0.001, Figure S3) were significant and positive in all countries.
These meta-correlations suggest that while the role of conservatism and trust in scientific information may vary
across countries, the subsequent relationships between that trust and outcome variables are consistent across
countries. Therefore, the association between conservatism and these outcomes could be mediated by trust in
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Figure 3.  Visual depiction of meta-correlations between conservative/right wing political ideology and (A)
trust in scientific information about coronavirus across the three cross-sectional waves for each country;
(B) concern about contracting the coronavirus across the three cross-sectional waves for each country; (C)
compliance with recommended preventative behaviors to avoid contracting or spreading the coronavirus
across the three cross-sectional waves for each country; (D) support for lockdown restrictions across the three
cross-sectional waves for each country. Figures were constructed in Microsoft Excel using the same spreadsheet
in which the meta-correlations were generated. Note: Bolded values depict significant meta-correlations for all
sub-figures. Values > 0.08 are significant at p < 0.05, values > 0.09 are significant at p < 0.01, and values > 0.10 are
significant at p < 0.001.
scientific information, so long as an association between conservatism and trust in scientific information about
the coronavirus is observed.

Multigroup path analysis. The results of our path analyses suggested that the association between political ideology and trust in scientific information about the coronavirus did not differ between the U.S. and Canada
but was significantly stronger in the United States for 15 out of the 17 countries and in Canada for 13 out of the 17
countries (Table 3). Further evidence in these models suggest that this association is strongest in North America,
with one exception (Indonesia). The indirect effect of political ideology on concerns about contracting COVID19 (i.e., ideology→trust in science→COVID-19 concern) was only significant in one other country (Italy);
as was the indirect effect for compliance (i.e., ideology→trust in science→COVID-19 concern→COVID-19
compliance; in Spain), and the indirect effect for support for lockdown restrictions (i.e., ideology→trust in
science→COVID-19 concern→lockdown restrictions) was only significant in two other countries (Spain, the
Netherlands), one of which exhibited an effect in the opposite direction (the Netherlands).

Discussion

Across three studies, we found evidence that among Americans, conservatism is associated with less compliance
with recommended preventative behaviors to avoid coronavirus infection, sequentially mediated through trust in
scientific information sources and concern about the threat of personal infection by coronavirus. Studies 1a–1b
found and replicated evidence for indirect effects of conservatism on concern about contracting coronavirus
through trust in science in two representative samples of the U.S. population before and after the 2020 U.S.
presidential election. Studies 2a–2b replicated these findings with independent representative samples of the U.S.
population, and found evidence that this indirect effect sequentially extends to compliance with preventative
behaviors. Study 3 further replicates these patterns among representative samples of Americans, and expands
the model by adding support for lockdown restrictions as another outcome. Such findings are consistent with
other studies of American populations s ee4–7.
Evidence was more mixed, however, for the hypothesis that the indirect effects we observed would be strongest
in, or unique to, the United States. The sequential indirect effect model in the U.S. was found in only two other
countries in our sample—Canada and Indonesia. Divergent meta-correlations between conservatism and other
variables in the model, particularly trust in scientific information about the coronavirus, appear to be driving the
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Indirect
effect on
% of total effect Curtailments

Path a
comparisons:
United States

Path a
comparisons:
Canada

United States

–

b = − 0.01,
SE = 0.03,
t = − 0.40,
p = 0.692

Canada

b = 0.01,
SE = 0.03,
–
t = 0.40, p = 0.692

Australia

b = − 0.15,
SE = 0.03,
t = − 4.21,
p < 0.001

b = − 0.17,
SE = 0.05,
t = − 3.27,
p = 0.001

n.s

Spain

b = − 0.07,
SE = 0.03,
t = − 2.17,
p = 0.030

b = − 0.08,
SE = 0.04,
t = − 1.93,
p = 0.053

− 0.11 (0.03)*** n.s

− 0.04 (0.01)**

France

b = − 0.13,
SE = 0.04,
t = − 3.29,
p = 0.001

b = − 0.14,
SE = 0.05,
t = − 3.00,
p = 0.002

n.s

n.s

n.s

n.s

Germany

b = − 0.09,
SE = 0.04,
t = − 2.38,
p = 0.017

b = − 0.11,
SE = 0.05,
t = − 1.92,
p = 0.054

n.s

n.s

n.s

n.s

Hungary

b = − 0.26,
SE = 0.04,
t = − 6.41,
p < 0.001

b = − 0.27,
SE = 0.05,
t = − 5.28,
p < 0.001

n.s

n.s

n.s

n.s

Indonesia

b = − 0.05,
SE = 0.03,
t = − 1.77,
p = 0.076

b = − 0.07,
SE = 0.04,
t = − 1.51,
p = 0.131

− 0.12 (0.03)*** − 0.01 (.01)*

Ireland

b = − 0.11,
SE = 0.03,
t = − 3.24,
p = 0.001

b = − 0.13,
SE = 0.05,
t = − 2.56,
p = 0.010

n.s

n.s

n.s

n.s

Israel

b = − 0.12,
SE = 0.03,
t = − 3.36,
p < 0.001

b = − 0.13,
SE = 0.05,
t = − 2.78,
p = 0.005

n.s

n.s

n.s

n.s

Italy

b = − 0.09,
SE = 0.04,
t = − 2.35,
p = 0.018

b = − 0.10,
SE = 0.05,
t = − 2.14,
p = 0.032

− 0.10 (0.04)**

− 0.01 (0.01)*

n.s

n.s

South Korea

b = − 0.23,
SE = 0.03,
t = − 7.57,
p < 0.001

b = − 0.24,
SE = 0.04,
t = − 5.35,
p < 0.001

n.s

n.s

n.s

n.s

Malaysia

b = − 0.14,
SE = 0.03,
t = − 4.36,
p < 0.001

b = − 0.16,
SE = .05,
t = − 3.36,
p < .001

n.s

n.s

n.s

n.s

Netherlands

b = − 0.18,
SE = 0.03,
t = − 5.18,
p < 0.001

b = − 0.20,
SE = 0.05,
t = − 3.95,
p < 0.001

n.s

n.s

n.s

0.03 (0.02)*

Philippines

b = − 0.13,
SE = 0.03,
t = − 4.09,
p < 0.001

b = − 0.14,
SE = 0.04,
t = − 3.15,
p = 0.002

n.s

n.s

n.s

n.s

Poland

b = − 0.11,
SE = 0.04,
t = − 3.06,
p = 0.002

b = − 0.12,
SE = 0.05,
t = − 2.53,
p = 0.011

n.s

n.s

n.s

n.s

Serbia

b = − 0.09,
SE = 0.04,
t = − 1.94,
p = 0.052

b = − 0.10,
SE = 0.06,
t = − 1.70,
p = 0.088

n.s

n.s

n.s

n.s

Country

Ideology →
Trust Science

Indirect effect
on Concern

Indirect effect
% of total effect on Compliance

% of total effect

− 0.19 (0.01)*** − 0.02 (.01)***

22%

− 0.09 (.01)***

66%

− 0.09 (.01)***

61%

− 0.20 (0.03)*** − 0.01 (.01)*

19%

− 0.10 (.02)***

NA

− 0.08 (.01)***

NA

n.s

n.s

14%

NA

− 0.05 (.01)***

n.s

NA

26%

− 0.04 (0.01)*** NA

− 0.05 (0.01)*** NA

NA

Continued
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Path a
comparisons:
United States

Path a
comparisons:
Canada

Turkey

b = − 0.24,
SE = 0.04,
t = − 6.47,
p < 0.001

United Kingdom

b = − 0.20,
SE = 0.03,
t = − 5.81,
p < 0.001

Country

Indirect
effect on
% of total effect Curtailments

Ideology →
Trust Science

Indirect effect
on Concern

b = − 0.26,
SE = 0.05,
t = − 5.29,
p < 0.001

n.s

n.s

n.s

n.s

b = − 0.21,
SE = 0.04,
t = − 4.68,
p < 0.001

n.s

n.s

n.s

n.s

Indirect effect
% of total effect on Compliance

% of total effect

Table 3.  Indirect effects of political ideology on each variable, and multigroup comparisons for the association
between ideology and trust in science, from Fig. 4. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, n.s. = not significant.
The USA and Canada were the reference group in each comparison. Bold values depict significant results.
Calculations of the proportion of the total effect calculated by the indirect effect were made by dividing the
indirect effect of trust in science by the total effect. If the total effect was not significant or in the opposite
direction, the calculation was not feasible, and thus NA (Not Available) is indicated).

Figure 4.  Path Model tested in each of the 19 countries. Path a is the path for which multigroup comparisons
were estimated. Figure was constructed in Microsoft PowerPoint.

non-replication of the model outside of these three countries. Across the countries sampled, trust in scientific
information about the coronavirus was consistently correlated with concern about contracting the virus, compliance, and support for lockdown restrictions (Figures S1–S3), suggesting that its importance is generalizable16.
Yet, meta-correlations between conservatism and rust in scientific information about coronavirus, concern
about contracting coronavirus, self-reported behavior compliance, and support for lockdown restrictions were
consistently stronger in the U.S. and Canada compared to other countries. Further, meta-correlations of similar
magnitude consistently emerged for Indonesia. Thus, while the U.S. did indeed demonstrate stronger patterns
than most other nations, it did not do so uniquely.
That Canadians exhibited similar responses to Americans is partly explainable through its proximity to,
and shared media ecosystem with, the United States see61 and indeed, misinformation about the coronavirus in
Canadian social media appears to originate from U.S. media62. The same pattern emerging in Indonesia, however,
cannot logically be explained by media overlap with the United States. Rather, the emergence of similar (but
weaker) indirect effects in Indonesia may be explainable by a similarly extreme polarization around trust in the
scientific consensus, within the context of the coronavirus p
 andemic63.
Regardless, one broader implication of these findings is that across the countries we sampled from, conservatism neither universally nor necessarily predicts non-compliant coronavirus behaviors or even lack of concern
in and of itself. While care should be used comparing meta-correlations for conservatism across countries, as
its precise meaning can vary cross-nationally64 and across time and cultural groups65,66, evidence of political
groups clustering along a left–right axis can be used to make cautious statements of patterns s ee66–68. Although
there are psychological factors associated with conservatism that may predispose conservatives to generally
distrust science more [ see28,30], our results suggest that this association is not an inevitability across the globe,
but rather, emergent from specific national contexts. That we never found conservatism to positively predict
trust in scientific information about coronavirus, even in Israel, where conservative leadership took a hard line
during the pandemic, suggests a tendency may still be present. It is also worth noting that conservatism was, in
many countries, positively associated with lockdown restrictions, perhaps resonating with authoritarian tendencies [see30]. That said, the results from the U.S., Canada, and Indonesia also clearly suggest that, under the right
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circumstances, liberals can be more sensitive to certain threats than conservatives, in line with multidimensional
approaches to understanding ideology and t hreat13,38,39.
The results we observe suggest that part of how political ideology relates to threat perceptions, however multidimensional, operates through trust in information about the relevant threat—in this case, the threat of personal
infection with coronavirus. While conservatives and liberals both can be more or less sensitive to threats depending on the type of threat (commission vs omission, see14), what our results suggest is that distrust in warnings
about the threat may lessen the degree to which the threat is perceived at all. However, it should be noted that
such associations need not inevitably lead to disaster. That Canada and Indonesia, despite sharing the patterns
found in the U.S., did not experience the same degree of catastrophic losses from the coronavirus pandemic
as the United States hints that, individual differences aside, early, unified action by political elites and systemic
preparation may help protect against the negative effects instantiated by low trust in science [see69], a possibility
supported by findings that countries with earlier, more restrictive pandemic responses have fared better thus far
[see70–72]. Further, the positive meta-correlations we observe between conservatism and support for lockdown
restrictions in many of the countries sampled implies that, perhaps owing to overlap between conservatism and
authoritarianism, conservatives will support such measures if they are not positioned as contradictory to their
ingroup by partisan media (as in the U.S. and Canada, where the meta-correlations were negative).
The most important limitation of these data and analyses is that they are observational (i.e., correlational),
and thus, causality cannot be inferred, despite arguments across recent literature for the directionality used in
our models ( see16–18). Further, it has been argued, and demonstrated, that regression-based mediation models
based on correlational data can be prone to biased effect sizes when variable error terms are correlated ( see73).
While we have taken steps to avoid this possibility, including using bootstrapping and path modelling rather
than traditional Baron-Kenney mediation, Bullock and colleagues (2010) note that even with best practices, this
possibility cannot be completely disregarded. Nevertheless, Hayes (2017) notes that the bootstrapping procedures
are typically acceptable with correlational data so long as the links tested are theoretically sound, and the models
we tested were grounded in emergent literature (see16–18). Further, at least within the United States, links between
conservatism and trust in science more generally are reflecting in existing evidence15,40–44.
A second limitation of these studies is that while they examine conservatism, as understood by participants,
they conceptualize conservatism as a unitary construct60 and they do not examine ideological factors among
conservatives that might have divergent effects upon attitudes and behaviors within the coronavirus pandemic,
such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; s ee35–37) or social dominance orientation (SDO; see74,75). While we
did not find, for example, a relationship between conservatisvm and concern about coronavirus infection in our
Australian samples in Study 3, Clarke et al. (2021) found relationships between some specific dimensions of SDO
and RWA76, such that they predicted less concern about contracting the coronavirus, similar to the associations
with RWA in American s amples77. Our single-item measure of unitary conservatism cannot distinguish between
laissez-faire conservatism (sometimes called economic conservatism) and authoritarian conservatism (sometimes called social conservatism) [see78]. Because we measured a unitary construct of conservatism, participants
could have different understandings of “conservatism,” both within and between countries. These limitations
are particularly important for understanding the positive meta-correlations between conservatism and support
for lockdown restrictions that we observe in the majority of countries that we sampled. Thus, further research
should examine more specific elements and dimensions of ideology as well as high-level endorsement of “conservatism” or “liberalism.”
In a similar vein, our findings are limited in that we cannot directly test why conservatism is negatively associated with trust in scientific information about the coronavirus pandemic in some countries, most notably the
United States and Canada. While existing literature on general scientific polarization (for a review, s ee5) would
suggest that conservatism may be linked to negative views of scientists and scientists as politicized, antagonistic
outgroups (e.g., liberals, elites), our studies do not measure perceptions of scientists as a group. Another possibility, suggested by Gollwitzer and colleagues’ findings (2020) is that politicized media ecosystems play a role in
shaping such relationships. Future research should investigate the role such factors play in the associations that
we have observed here. Lastly, future research should also endeavor to gather information on these associations
in South America, Africa, India, and other parts of the globe we were unable to reach.

Conclusion

Here, three studies reinforce links between conservatism and attitudes and behaviors during the coronavirus
among Americans, while also explicitly highlighting the role that trust in science and scientific information
sources about the pandemic plays in these processes. Apart from conceptually replicating and extending existing
research on Americans, Study 3 suggests that Canadians and Indonesians may also exhibit the same polarization of attitudes through trust in scientific information about the coronavirus. These results suggest that, rather
than conservatism per se inevitably leading to skepticism about pandemics, the emergence of such a link is
contextual, similar to prior findings regarding polarizing issues such as climate change s kepticism42. Therefore,
management of future pandemics may hinge upon how well scientific communicators can manage the contextual
framing of the pandemic as it arises, lest the particularly disastrous patterns observed in places like the United
States be repeated.

Data availability

For all studies, materials, data, and analysis code are available here: [https://osf.io/ugde5/?view_only=dc4c3
b9d8a79433cab5a2fbc9e663a1d].
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